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Abstract  
This paper reviews European household waste management schemes and provides an 
insight into their effectiveness in reducing or diverting household waste. The paper 
also considers the feasibility of replicating such schemes in England. Selected case 
studies include those implemented using variable charging schemes, direct regulation 
and household incentivisation (reduced disposal charges). A total of 15 case studies 
were selected from developed countries in the EU where some schemes have operated 
for more than a decade. Criteria for assessing the effectiveness and replicability of 
schemes were developed using scheme progress towards targets, response time, 
compatibility with government policy, ease of administration and operation, and 
public acceptance as attributes. The study demonstrates the capability of these 
schemes to significantly reduce household waste and suggests changes to allow their 
possible adoption in England. One of the main barriers to their adoption is the 
Environmental Protection Act, 1990 that prevents English local authorities (LAs) 
from implementing the variable charging method for household waste management. 
This barrier could be removed through a change in legislation. The need to derive 
consistent data and standardise the method of measuring the effectiveness of schemes 
is also highlighted. 
 
Keywords: Household waste; waste reduction; waste diversion; economic 
instruments; regulatory instruments; incentivisation 
 
1. Introduction 
Waste is generated by activities in all economic sectors and often indicates the 
inefficient use of natural resources (Phillips et al., 2001), loss of materials and energy 
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in production processes and unsustainable consumption patterns (EEA, 2002). 
Currently in England 67% of municipal solid waste (MSW) generated is landfilled, 
9% incinerated and 23.5% recycled or composted (DEFRA, 2006). Results of the 
latest survey show that in England 29.7 million tonnes of MSW was produced during 
2004/05, which was 2.1% more than that produced in 2003/04. However, the average 
annual MSW increase in England is 1.5% from 2000/01 to 2004/05. Out of this, 25.7 
million tonnes (about 86%) was from households alone (DEFRA, 2006). It has been 
reported that the amount of total household waste and per capita waste increased by 
around 15% and 12%, respectively, between 1996-97 and 2002-03 (EEA, 2005). 
However, no further increase in the household waste production was observed until 
2004-05 (DEFRA, 2006). Household waste is mainly comprised of paper and card, 
kitchen and garden waste. The Waste Strategy 2000 set MSW recycling or 
composting targets at 33% by 2015 (DETR, 2000). Also, in the UK, the EU Landfill 
Directive (1999/31/EC) requires the reduction in biodegradable municipal waste to 
75% of the 1995 disposal level by year 2010 and 35% reduction by 2020. Therefore, 
England requires more sustainable and practicable waste management methods to 
comply with the EU Landfill Directive. A universal waste hierarchy is suggested for 
developing a sustainable waste management strategy, the elements of which include 
prevention, reuse, recycle, recover and finally disposal in landfills (Fiorucci et al., 
2003). 
 
Continuous rise in waste quantities is imposing economic and environmental costs on 
society in most of the European countries for its management (EEA, 2000). The 
increase in the amount of waste is mainly attributed to the inability of member states 
to decouple economic growth from waste growth. According to European 
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Environment Agency report (EEA, 2002), only Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland, 
and to a lesser extent Sweden and Denmark, have been successful in decoupling 
economic growth and growth in waste production. This decoupling is an objective of 
the 6th Environment Action Programme (2001-2010) (Gervais, 2002). 
 
In Europe, the implementation of the waste hierarchy has become difficult due to 
complexity and multidisciplinary problems involving social, economic, environmental 
and technical aspects (Philips, et al. 2001). However, laws have been established by 
governments at international, national, regional and local levels to facilitate the 
establishment of challenging targets and to ensure a more sustainable approach to 
waste management in which less waste is produced and more waste is either reused or 
value recovered from it. As a result, the use of household waste management schemes 
has become widely acceptable for effective waste management towards the top of the 
waste management hierarchy, i.e. waste reduction. 
 
Several schemes based on economic, regulatory and incentive instruments have been 
successfully used in Europe to manage municipal waste (INFORM, 2005; Eunomia, 
2002, 2003; Green Alliance, 2002; Dungan, 2003). Economic instruments refer to 
schemes established based on variable charging in order to implement the polluter 
pays principle. In these schemes, the local authorities (LAs) charge fees from 
householders for managing their waste. Regulatory instruments refer to the laws or 
regulations that are introduced by governments in order to enable the LAs to use them 
in the establishment of schemes. Incentive based instruments refer to schemes in 
which LAs provide some financial assistance or other ways to encourage 
householders to participate in waste management. The performance of the schemes in 
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different countries varies depending on the social, economic, political and physical 
conditions of the areas.  
In the present study, the focus is on the reduction of household waste in England 
using economic, regulatory and incentive based instruments that have already been 
used in Europe to implement strategies by LAs in order to address the waste issue. So 
this paper reviews household waste management schemes implemented in Europe, 
assesses their effectiveness in achieving the set targets and considers their replicability 
in England. 
  
2.  Materials and methods  
2.1 Procedure and selection of selected schemes 
 
To review household waste reduction schemes, a method for selecting the schemes 
was required. Schemes were selected after extensive literature review and consultation 
with the Environment Agency (EA). However, most of the studies were taken from 
two Eunomia reports (Eunomia 2002, 2003). The most relevant schemes from Europe 
were chosen as they share a number of common features. For example, EU Member 
States have to comply with common legislation on waste management such as the 
packaging directive. It was expected that Member States would provide a wide range 
of credible data for good analysis and comparison. It was ensured that selected 
schemes cut across the principal instruments (economic, regulatory and incentivised) 
used for the implementation of waste management schemes.  
 
After a comprehensive literature review, the following fifteen household waste 
management schemes were selected for our study: 
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1.  Belgium: Pay-Per-Bag scheme (Eunomia, 2002, 2003) 
2.  Denmark: Weight-based charging scheme (Eunomia, 2002, 2003) 
3.  Germany: Weight-and volume-based system (Eunomia, 2002) 
4.  Italy: Tagged bag scheme (Eunomia, 2003) 
5.  Luxemburg: Combined volume and weight-based scheme (Eunomia, 2002, 2003) 
6.  Sweden: Weight-based scheme (Eunomia, 2002) 
7.  Ireland: Plastic bag environmental levy (Dungan, 2003) 
8.  Germany:  MSW management scheme (INFORM, 2005) 
9.  Belgium: BEBAT scheme for battery collection (Eunomia, 2003) 
10. Finland: Paper collection scheme (Eunomia, 2002) 
11. Belgium: Brussels scheme for the management of waste paper and board 
(Eunomia, 2002) 
12. Netherlands: Paper and fibre collection (Eunomia, 2002) 
13. Belgium: Flanders MSW management (Green Alliance, 2002; Eunomia, 2002) 
14. Sweden: Home composting scheme (Eunomia, 2002) 
15. United Kingdom: West Sussex ‘Real Nappy’ initiative (Eunomia, 2003). 
 
2.2. Review of schemes 
A preliminary review was performed during an extensive literature survey for all 
selected 15 schemes. During the survey, the important issues in the schemes were 
identified and critically examined. These include the methodology of establishing the 
scheme (i.e., data gathering on waste arising, quantities, number of households to be 
served etc.), the operational and administrative requirements of the scheme, the 
targets set to be achieved, the level of target actually achieved and the time period 
within which the achievement of the set target was desired. The limitations of each 
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scheme were highlighted, and the effectiveness and replicability of each scheme were 
considered on the basis of observations.  
 
For a more detailed review of the 15 schemes, the data was normalised in order to 
compare and assess the effectiveness of the schemes.   
 
2.3 Assessment of the effectiveness of schemes 
The effectiveness of schemes is an essential aspect of this study. To appropriately 
comment on the effectiveness of the schemes, criteria were developed using 
achievement, time and costs as basic parameters. 
 
Achievement of each scheme was judged based on the total quantity of waste reduced 
or diverted. Figures provided were normalised to waste kg/cap/yr for better 
understanding and ease of analysis and comparison. Waste reduction or diversion was 
scored based on performance as presented in Table 1. The quantities of waste for 
diversion are higher than those of reduction because household waste diversion, 
which is largely achieved through recycling and composting, is more easily achieved 
than reduction at source. Skumatz (2000) observed that source reduction schemes 
have attracted less attention than recycling because source reduction is difficult to 
achieve, difficult to quantify, can be tedious and can be data intensive. 
 
Time refers to the period expected to achieve the set targets by the scheme. This is 
considered as an important parameter for assessing the effectiveness of schemes 
because programmes are time bound, otherwise they could be unnecessarily expensive 
to achieve the goals. Therefore, weighted scores were also allotted to time taken to 
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reduce or divert a certain quantity of waste, which is shown in Table 2. For the 15 
case studies, the score points also differ in respect of reduction and diversion due to 
similar reasons as for the case of achievement.  
 
The cost of schemes (capital and operational) is the third parameter considered for 
assessing the effectiveness of a scheme. Although this parameter is important in 
assessing effectiveness, it was not possible to develop a criterion for costing the 
schemes due to the following reasons: (a) great variations amongst countries in the 
ways household wastes management schemes are designed and managed. For 
instance, costs for kerbside waste collection will greatly differ from drop off or take 
back methods for recycling schemes, (b) the administrative and operational costs for 
running schemes could be hugely different from one country to another due to the 
technical requirements for operating the schemes, for example, the lock gate scheme 
in Germany, which was described as technically cumbersome and (c) lack of data on 
cost of schemes; of the fifteen schemes only the German lock gate scheme provided 
any cost data, in the form of total equipment cost without regard to operational and 
administrative costs. 
 
Due to the constraints above, the assessment of selected schemes on a cost basis was 
not viable. This is a limitation of the assessment. The assessment of the effectiveness 
of the scheme was therefore limited to two parameters, that is, achievement in terms 
of the quantity of waste reduced or diverted and the time it takes to achieve set targets. 
The criteria for ranking the schemes are shown in Table 3. 
  
2.4 Applicability of schemes to England 
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To determine the replicability of the schemes reviewed in England, a criterion was 
developed using effectiveness of schemes, ease of operation, compatibility with 
government policies and public acceptability as key parameters. Each parameter was 
scored with a maximum of 5 points. The following three categories of replicability 
were proposed: (a) readily replicable (R) schemes, that are in harmony with the above 
parameters, which do not require any modifications to be implemented (16-20), (b) 
modified (M) schemes, that will require some modification to enable them to be 
replicated, due to non conformity with some of the parameters (11-15) and (c) 
difficult (D) scheme, which refers to schemes that will be extremely difficult to be 
adopted with respect to the scheme’s non-conformity with government policy and 
effectiveness parameters (5-10). 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Detailed review 
A summary of the selected 15 schemes reviewed is presented in Table 4. It essentially 
indicates that three instruments (economic, regulatory and incentive based) are widely 
used in establishing household waste management schemes. Out of the 15 schemes, 7 
schemes were established using economic instruments, 6 using regulatory instruments 
and 2 schemes were established based on householder incentivisation.  
 
3.1.1. Performance of schemes based on amount of waste reduced or diverted 
Assessing the performance of the schemes with regards to the amount of waste 
reduction or diversion is one of the key objectives of this study. However, only 4 out 
of the 15 schemes could be compared based on performance because the 4 schemes 
provided data on clear targets and achievements in similar units or in units that were 
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agreeable after conversion. In the remaining schemes data were either provided for 
achievements or targets only, and in some instances, in percentages without actual 
values to allow conversions. The results presented in Fig. 1 indicate that waste 
reduction/diversion rate of up to 95 kg/cap/yr was achieved in the case of a paper 
recovery scheme in Finland. The results also indicate that set targets were actually 
exceeded by two schemes, the Belgian MSW diversion scheme (target 35 kg/cap/yr; 
achieved 40 kg/cap/yr) and the Irish plastic bag scheme (target 2 kg/cap/yr; achieved 
4 kg/cap/yr). In the remaining schemes although targets were not fully achieved, 
performances ranged from 53 to 67%. The actual quantity of waste reduced or 
diverted / kg/cap/yr is shown in Table 5. The results also showed that the quantities of 
wastes reduced or diverted by the schemes range from 4 kg/cap/yr in the Irish plastic 
bag scheme to 1600 kg/family/yr in the West Sussex real nappy scheme. The amount 
seems small after normalisation by comparing the quantity achieved by the scheme 
with various per capita waste generation of the country where the schemes are 
implemented. Thus performances after normalisation range between 0.01 to 5 
kg/cap/yr. 
 
It is observed that the performances differ greatly between schemes due to the 
different waste streams handled by schemes and whether the goal of the scheme was 
waste reduction or diversion. 
 
3.1.2. Performance of economic instruments based schemes 
The performance of 6 out of the 7 schemes based on economic instruments was 
compared. The results obtained are presented in Table 5. The Danish weight-based 
MSW scheme achieved a diversion rate of up to 120 kg/cap/yr (0.2 kg/cap/yr, 
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normalised) whilst the Irish plastic bag levy scheme achieved a 4 kg/cap/yr (0.01 
kg/cap/yr, normalised) reduction rate. On average, the economic instrument based 
schemes achieved reduction/diversion rates of 43 kg/cap/yr of the targets they were 
set to achieve. However, the average achieved in terms of actual waste reduction was 
not normalised because of the differences in the per capita waste production of the 
countries.  
 
3.1.3. Performance of regulatory instruments based schemes 
Achievement results of the schemes established using regulatory instruments indicate 
that the amount of waste reduced or diverted by the schemes are 40 and 95 kg/cap/yr 
for Belgium (MSW Flanders scheme) and Finland, respectively. Table 5 shows the 
achievement of these two schemes that provided data on their targets.  
 
3.1.4. Performance of incentivised schemes 
Two schemes in the 15 case studies were based on provision of incentives to 
householders in order to encourage them to participate in waste management schemes. 
The schemes include the Swedish household composting and the West Sussex real 
nappy scheme in the UK. 
 
The Swedish households using the scheme, composted an estimated quantity of 1600 
tonnes/yr of food wastes, this reduced the amount of waste going to landfill by about 
6 kg/cap/yr (0.01 kg/cap/yr, normalised) in communities where the scheme was used 
(Table 5). Households that have installed composting facilities within their area were 
qualified to apply for a reduction in waste fees. In the year 2000, the total fee 
reduction (incentive) to households corresponds to €211,111/yr (~ £131,944) or 
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€133.3/household/yr (~ £83.30). The West Sussex real nappy scheme provides free 
laundry services for families using the scheme. The results of the scheme show that 
500 families participated in the scheme between 1999 and 2000 and this saved the 
production of 800 tonnes of disposable nappies as well as cost savings of €32,000 (~ 
£20,000) for the local authority. The waste reduction per family that used the scheme 
translated to 1600 kg /family/yr and the incentive provided amounted to €48/family/yr 
(~ £30). 
 
3.2. Assessment of the effectiveness of schemes 
Assessment of the effectiveness of schemes was the major objective of the present 
study. Three parameters considered for developing the criterion for assessing the 
effectiveness of the schemes were achievement, time and total costs of schemes as 
explained in section 2.3. The schemes were categorised in to three groups based on 
the instruments used for establishing them to allow for comparison of the 
effectiveness between the schemes and to explain the differences observed in the 
discussion section. The assessment was categorised as good, fair or poor based on 
their scores. The results of the effectiveness are presented in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1. Effectiveness of economic instrument schemes 
The results of the assessment of the effectiveness of the economic instrument based 
schemes is presented in Table 6. Within the confines of the assessment criterion used, 
the results indicate that two of the schemes (Ireland and Denmark) were ranked as 
good, and the remaining four were rated as fair (Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy and 
Sweden). The remaining scheme from Germany in this category was not rated due to 
a lack of data.    
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3.2.2. Effectiveness of regulatory instrument schemes 
The results of the assessment of the effectiveness of the schemes established based on 
regulatory instruments are presented in Table 7. Within the limits of the criterion 
used, the results indicate that the paper recovery scheme from Finland was the most 
effective and ranked as good. Three other schemes were rated as fairly effective 
whilst two schemes were not rated due to insufficient information.  
 
3.2.3 Effectiveness of incentivised schemes 
The results of the assessment of the effectiveness of the incentivised schemes are 
presented in Table 8. The results indicate that the Swedish household composting 
scheme was rated as fairly effective based on the criterion used whilst the real nappy 
scheme was rated as good.        
 
3.3. Assessment of the applicability of schemes in England 
The potential replicability of the reviewed schemes in England was a key objective of 
our study. As a result, a criterion for determining the replicability was developed 
using compatibility with government policies (particularly on variable charging) as a 
major parameter, with effectiveness of scheme, public acceptability and ease of 
operation and administration being complementary parameters, as discussed in section 
2.4. The results presented in Table 9 show that only four of the 15 schemes could be 
readily replicated in England, out of which three schemes are regulatory and one is 
incentive based. Further analysis shows that 6 out of the 15 schemes would require 
modifications in order to be replicated in England (2 schemes are economic, 3 are 
regulatory based and 1 is incentive based). The results also indicate that 5 (all are 
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economic instrument based) out of the 15 schemes would be difficult to replicate in 
England.  
 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Performance of economic instrument schemes  
Economic instruments are essentially based on the polluter pays principle, which puts 
the responsibility of waste management on the producer of waste, in this case, the 
householders. The instrument is known by different names in different countries such 
as the variable charging, unit-based pricing, pay-as-you-throw, etc. The variable 
charging system could be based on weight, volume or weight and volume. 
 
As could be seen in this review, 7 of the 15 reviewed schemes were established using 
economic instruments based on variable charging. The use of economic instruments to 
establish waste management schemes in Europe is well accepted and it is used in 
Belgium, Italy, France, Germany, Sweden, Spain, etc. The results in Table 5 show 
that the Danish MSW and Irish plastic bag schemes both established under the 
variable charging system have made significant MSW reduction and diversion 
respectively.  The Danish scheme diverted 120 kg/cap/yr of MSW, which translates to 
0.2 kg/cap/yr of the actual reduction when compared with the Danish per capita waste 
production of 530 kg/cap/yr, and the Irish scheme reduced 4 kg/cap/yr of plastic bag 
waste, which translates to 0.01 kg/cap/yr, when compared with the Irish per capita 
MSW production. In the 6 schemes, which provided data, the use of economic 
instruments made a significant reduction or diversion of MSW. The reason for the 
increasing popularity of variable charging is the economic incentive of having to pay 
for waste management by the amount generated which rewards recyclers and which 
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has caused a subsequent reduction in tonnes of waste in communities where the 
instrument is used. This is in consensus with the views of Shapiro (1995) that the 
variable charging system provides a direct economic incentive for people to prevent 
waste generation, to recycle and to compost. 
 
A survey of LAs to assess attitudes towards direct charging of householders for waste 
management services suggests that existing legislation does not permit LAs to use 
variable charging schemes (Eunomia, 2003). The report identified direct charging 
barriers and mechanisms for increasing recycling through household participation. 
The public may not welcome the variable charging method because of the general 
belief that waste collection is already paid for through the council tax (Price, 2001; 
Rayner, 2003). Government has ruled out charging schemes for the foreseeable future 
despite considerable analysis (Ernst & Young, 2002) but such schemes have not been 
ruled out altogether. The Government has however ruled out a separate national tax 
on household waste (HM Treasury, 2003) which is an alternative option. The Local 
Government Association (2004) is lobbying Government to give power to councils to 
implement direct and variable charging schemes. Despite existing legislation, LAs are 
able to charge for excess waste by restricting the size of containers they provide. In 
this manner, home composting can also be encouraged and waste production can be 
significantly reduced. The House of Commons Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee (2003, 2005) is strongly in favour of LAs being given the ability to 
introduce variable charging schemes if they so wish but argues that they should only 
be introduced if they do not have an unfair impact, especially on low income families. 
Potentially, direct charging could reward those households that produce less waste. 
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However, in England, kerbside collection is increasing under the provisions of the 
Household Waste Recycling Act 2003 that aims to increase the amount of recyclables 
to meet the prescribed targets (DEFRA, 2005). English waste collection authorities 
are to collect separately at least two types of recyclables at the kerbside from all 
households by 2015 at reasonable cost. Under the act, materials recycling facilities 
(MRFs) are not an acceptable alternative for the separate collection of two different 
types of recyclables. In order to comply with the act, direct charging can be 
implemented for excess waste. Some EU member states are already performing 
significantly better than England, for example Austria collected >65% and the 
Netherlands and Germany both around 40% of all MSW as separate waste fractions in 
1999 (European Commission, 2003). Householder charging is much the most widely 
used instrument to influence waste generation and reductions in residual waste 
(Resource Recovery Forum, 2004). 
 
4.2. Performance of regulatory instrument schemes 
Regulatory policy is an instrument based on legislation introduced by countries in 
order to address waste problems. In most cases, some form of legislation is required to 
force the implementation of a waste management scheme. The result of this study 
shows (in Table 4) that 6 of the schemes reviewed were established using regulatory 
instruments. It is evident from the study that regulatory instruments can successfully 
be used to address the generic MSW problem. However, most of the regulatory 
instrument schemes were assessed for specific waste streams.  
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Within the limitations of the criterion used for assessing the effectiveness of the 
schemes, there seems to be no significant difference in achievements between the 
regulatory based schemes.  
 
All six regulatory-based schemes were established through producer responsibility 
with respect to household wastes. For instance, the 1993 Belgian law of ecotaxes 
aimed to give incentives to consumers to change their behaviour towards product 
consumption in an environmentally friendly way. In order to achieve this, a tax was 
imposed on a range of products to be sold. Therefore, the BEBAT scheme was 
introduced to collect used dry batteries for subsequent recycling. The batteries are 
exempt from ecotax if the manufacturers agree to set up a recycling and collection 
scheme. The paper schemes of Finland and the Netherlands targeted waste paper 
collection from households. In the Netherlands scheme, local authorities are 
responsible for collecting paper and board from the household. The paper industry 
then purchases this material from LAs and it pays for further processing and disposal. 
All the schemes were implemented through producer responsibility. The main reason 
for the participation of industries in household waste schemes may be attributed to the 
imposition of tax on certain products. An increased price due to tax might bring a 
change in public perception towards the use of products. This may eventually reduce 
the market of such products.  
 
Good performance of most regulatory schemes is observed as it is easier to identify, 
separate and collect the specific waste streams. Also, breach of legislation may result 
in prosecution to the waste collectors and producers (Green Alliance, 2002). 
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4.3. Incentivised schemes 
Incentivised instruments are essentially based on the provision of incentives in cash or 
kind by waste management authorities to householders who participate in schemes. 
Two of the reviewed case studies were established based on the provision of 
incentives to householders who wish to participate in waste management schemes 
implemented by LAs. The results of the use of incentives to address household waste 
show a dramatic performance by the West Sussex real nappy scheme, which reduced 
at source 1600 kg/family/yr (Eunomia, 2003). The use of incentive schemes also 
achieved some diversion of ca. 6 kg/cap/yr of household waste to landfill in Sweden, 
which translates to 0.01kg/cap/yr, when compared to the Swedish 530 kg per capita 
waste generation. The performance of the two schemes was surprising because 
incentivised schemes do not seem to perform so well in reality. This is because the 
choice to participate in the scheme is entirely the decision of the householders, who 
despite the incentives on offer, may not feel comfortable to participate in recycling or 
composting of their waste. This is supported by Rayner (2003), who demonstrated in a 
newspaper survey report that some UK residents “avoided the recycling route by 
continuing to put everything in one bin for the general rubbish”, their argument being 
that they have paid for waste management and could not understand why they should 
be involved. 
 
The reason for the good performance of the two incentive-based schemes in West 
Sussex could be because they targeted specific waste streams and the wide publicity 
enjoyed by the scheme. This is supported by the fact that most of the schemes that 
addressed specific waste streams have significantly reduced or diverted waste, for 
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example as seen in the case of plastic bags in Ireland, battery collection and recycling 
in Belgium and paper recovery in Finland. 
 
4.4. Effectiveness of schemes 
The criteria used for assessing the effectiveness of the schemes have already been 
presented in detail in section 2.3.  
 
4.4.1. Effectiveness of the economic instruments based schemes 
The results of the assessment of the effectiveness of schemes based on economic 
instruments are presented in Table 6. The reason for the good performance of the Irish 
and Danish schemes is that both targeted specific waste streams (plastic bags and 
household composting) which make it easier for the householders and the operators to 
manage than total MSW that might require sorting before treatment or disposal. An 
additional reason for the effectiveness of the Irish plastic bag scheme is probably the 
charge of €6.7/kg (~ £4.20) which is higher than all other charging schemes reviewed. 
This cost might have been responsible for the change of people’s behaviour, which is 
a greater challenge to waste reduction (Grigg and Read, 2001).  
 
4.4.2. Effectiveness of the regulatory instruments  
The results of the effectiveness of the regulatory instrument based schemes are 
presented in Table 7. Using our criteria, only the Finland paper recovery scheme was 
rated as effectively good. The reason for this is probably twofold; firstly there is a 
long demand-lead history of paper recycling in Finland dating back to the 1940s; and 
secondly due to the involvement of the most experienced paper company in Finland 
(Paperinkerays Ltd), in the scheme, whose responsibility is to collect and recover 
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waste paper from households and offices. Paperinkerays maintains an information 
system pertaining to waste paper operations. The success of the scheme is also 
attributable to involvement of property owners in waste paper collection. Property 
owners were responsible for the provision of containers and collection of waste paper. 
Three of the schemes were rated as fairly effective and the other two could not be 
assessed due to lack of data. The effectiveness of the schemes could be attributable to 
being waste stream specific e.g. the battery and waste paper and board schemes in 
Belgium and the paper recovery schemes in Finland and the Netherlands, possibly due 
to ease of identification and handling. Another reason is that under producer 
responsibility, there don’t seem to be financial constraints for the operation of 
schemes and possible monitoring by government to ensure compliance. In the 
producer responsibility schemes reported in the literature, there are proper 
arrangements for financing the schemes by the stakeholders and all of them become 
obliged.  
 
4.4.3. Effectiveness of incentivised schemes 
The Swedish household food composting scheme was rated as fairly effective whilst 
the West Sussex real nappy scheme was rated as good. The reason for the 
effectiveness of the West Sussex real nappy scheme is the intensive campaigning and 
the assistance by hospitals, health officers, the local media, and increasing support 
from householders. Another possible reason for effectiveness could be the need to 
protect babies from rashes due to poor ventilation caused by the plastic content of 
non-real nappies.  
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4.5. Applicability of schemes in England  
The result of the assessment of the potential replicability of schemes in England 
shows that only 6 of the reviewed schemes could be directly replicated in England 
(Table 9). This is because the schemes were implemented using the producer 
responsibility that is already well established in the UK through the Environment Act 
1995. The two other schemes that could be readily replicated were established based 
on the provision of incentives, which is a widely accepted method of implementing 
schemes in the UK. The real nappy scheme is a good example of an incentive-based 
scheme in the UK. 
 
The results further suggest that 10 of the 15 schemes could be replicated in England 
with some modification. Most of these schemes were based on the variable charging 
system, which is not currently permitted in England. Some schemes, although not 
based on variable charging, would need modification because they employ fines of up 
to $10,000 per day (~ £5,600) on any county that fails to comply with the recycling 
targets (Green Alliance, 2002). These measures are not popular in Europe and would 
not be readily accepted in England. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Household waste management schemes adopt economic, regulatory or incentive based 
instruments that are widely acceptable across Europe. Many such schemes have been 
successful in achieving waste reduction. In the absence of a standardised method of 
measuring effectiveness of schemes, the quality of assessing the effectiveness of 
schemes is within the constraints of our criterion developed. This emphasises the need 
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for consistent data and in particular the need to standardise the measurement of 
effectiveness. Furthermore, whilst the success of some individual schemes can be 
highlighted, there is a lack of transparent data on the costs of commissioning, 
operating and monitoring household waste management schemes in relation to their 
waste reduction or diversion achievements. Schemes that are designed to manage 
specific waste streams achieve the greatest reduction or diversion, rather than the 
general MSW stream. 
 
Although some schemes were found to be highly effective, many cannot be replicated 
in England due to the policy barrier created by the Environmental Protection Act 1990 
which prohibits variable charging by LAs to implement waste management schemes. 
This suggests the need for central government to review policy with respect to that 
Act. 
 
The waste paper and board, real nappy and BEBAT schemes provide good potential 
for achieving waste reduction at household levels. In addition to these, the Belgian 
and German MSW schemes, Irish plastic bag environmental levy scheme, 
Netherlands waste paper scheme and Swedish home composting schemes would 
require modifications before possible implementation. 
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Table 1 
Assessment for achievement of the schemes based on the total quantity of waste 
reduced or diverted 
 
Criteria Scale kg/cap/yr Points 
< 3.9 2 
4 - 7.9 4 
8 - 11.9 6 
Reduction 
> 12 8 
< 19 2 
20 - 39 4 
40 - 79 6 Diversion 
> 79 8 
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Table 2 
Assessment for time to achieve the set target by the scheme 
 
Criteria Time - yr Points 
3 12 
6 9 
9 6 
Reduction 
12 3 
1 12 
2 9 
3 6 
Diversion 
4 3 
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Table 3 
Criteria for ranking the schemes 
 
Category Points 
Poor 1 - 7 
Fair 8 - 14 
Good 15 - 20 
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Table 4 
Category and goal of the fifteen schemes reviewed 
 
Instrument used Goal of scheme 
Country 
Economic Regulatory Incentive based Reduction Diversion
Belgium (F. B. MSW) X    X 
Denmark X    X 
Germany (MSW) X    X 
Italy X    X 
Luxemburg X    X 
Sweden (MSW) X    X 
Ireland X   X  
Germany (green dot)  X   X 
Belgium (battery)  X   X 
Finland  X   X 
Belgium (waste paper and 
board)  X  X  
Netherlands  X   X 
Belgium (Flanders MSW)  X    
Sweden (home composting)   X  X 
UK (real nappy)   X X  
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Table 5 
Normalised performance of the 15 schemes 
 
Country Amount of waste reduced or diverted (kg/cap/yr) 
Normalised amount of 
waste reduced or 
diverted (kg/cap/yr) 
Belgium ( F. B. MSW) 47 0.1 
Denmark 120 0.2 
Germany (MSW) 236 0.7 
Italy 17 0.04 
Luxemburg 32 0.07 
Sweden (MSW) 37 0.08 
Ireland 4 0.01 
Germany (green dot) ND ND 
Belgium (battery) ND ND 
Finland 95 0.5 
Belgium (waste paper and 
board) ND ND 
Netherlands ND ND 
Belgium (Flanders MSW) 40 0.03 
Sweden (home composting) 6 0.01 
UK 1,600 5 
ND: Not determined. 
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Table 6 
Assessment of the effectiveness of economic instrument schemes  
 
Country Achievement Time Total points Effectiveness 
Belgium (F. B. MSW) 6 6 12 Fair 
Denmark 6 9 15 Good 
Ireland 4 12 16 Good 
Italy 2 9 11 Fair 
Luxemburg 4 6 10 Fair 
Sweden (MSW) 2 6 8 Fair 
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Table 7 
 
Assessment of the effectiveness of schemes under the regulatory instrument 
 
 
 
Country Achievement Time Total points Effectiveness 
Belgium (battery) 8 3 11 Fair 
Finland 8 9 17 Good 
Belgium (waste paper and 
board) 6 6 12 Fair 
Belgium (Flanders, MSW) 6 3 9 Fair 
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Table 8 
Assessment of the effectiveness of incentive based schemes 
 
 
 
Country Achievement Time Total points Effectiveness 
Sweden (home composting) 2 9 11 Fair 
UK (real nappy) 8 12 20 Good 
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Table 9 
Applicability of the reviewed schemes in UK 
 
 
Country 
Compatibility 
with 
government 
policy 
Corrected 
effectiveness 
of scheme 
Ease of 
operation 
Public 
acceptability Total Applicability
a
Belgium (F. B., MSW) x 3 5 5 13 M 
Denmark x 3.8 ND 5 8.8 D 
Germany (MSW) x ND x 5 5 D 
Italy x 2.8 x 5 7.8 D 
Luxemburg x 2.5 x 5 7.5 D 
Sweden (MSW) x 2 x 5 7 D 
Ireland x 4 5 5 14 M 
Germany (Green dot) 5 ND 5 5 15 M 
Belgium (battery) 5 2.8 5 5 17.8 R 
Finland 5 4.3 5 5 19.3 R 
Belgium (waste paper 
and board) 5 3 5 5 18 R 
Netherlands 5 ND 5 5 15 M 
Belgium (Flanders, 
MSW) 
x 
2.3 5 5 12.3 M 
Sweden (home 
composting) 5 2.8 
x 5 12.8 M 
UK (Real Nappy) 5 5 5 5 20 R 
a R: readily applicable, M: applicable with some modification, D: difficult to apply. 
x Not conforming with the parameter. 
ND: Not determined. 
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Figure 1 
 
Performance of waste management schemes based on economic instruments in 
four EU Member States (amount of waste reduction/diversion against set targets)  
 
 
